PE Sieve Integration
With the integration of @hasharezade‘s PE Sieve project THOR is able to detect and report a variety of process implants like replaced or injected portable executables (process hollowing), injected shellcodes, hooks and in-memory patches.
Naturally, since @hasharezade’s project is an open source project, this feature will also be available in THOR Lite, the free version of THOR.
THOR v10.5 creates a process dump of any process that is considered suspicious or malicious.
This process dump can then be analyzed with standard tools later to examine the findings. Use the flag “–dump-procs” to activate this feature.
To prevent excessive disk space usage, new dumps overwrite old dumps of the same process. Also, THOR stores the dumps in a compressed form and will not generate dumps if less than 5 GB disk space is available.
Global Module Lookback
The current “–lookback” option allows you to restrict the Eventlog and log file scan to a given amount of days. E.g. by using “–lookback 3” you instruct THOR to check only the log entries that have been created in the last 3 days.
We’ve extended this feature to include all applicable modules, including “FileScan”, “Registry”, “Services”, “Registry Hives” and “EVTX Scan”. By setting the flags “–global-lookback –lookback 2” you instruct THOR to scan only elements that have been created or modified during the last 2 days. This reduces the scan duration significantly.
On our test systems, we were able to reduce the scan duration of a full filesystem scan and a lookback of three days to less than 4 minutes.
LNK File Parser
The link file parser module processes .lnk files, extracts relevant data and gathers more information on the linked contents. It also applies the anomaly detection methods to its contents to allow the detection of unknown threats.
- Default output files include a timestamp and not just the date
- Outputs include non-ASCII characters in a hex encoded form (use –ascii to revert to ASCII only output)
- THOR DBs “–resume” feature is deactivated by default and has to be manually activated using “–resume” due to significant performance implications caused by updating resume states in THOR DB
- New –portal* flags allow the licenses generation at runtime using our Netxron portal API
- New –yara-max-strings-per-rule flag limits the output of matching strings
- New –nofserrors flag suppresses all error messages regarding access permissions
- New –scanid-prefix allows users to set a custom prefix to allow the identification of group of scans
- New –print-signatures flag lists names and meta data of all included YARA and Sigma rules
With this blog post we would like to inform you that our End-of-Life (EOL) products THOR 8 and SPARK will reach their End-if-Service-Life (EoSL) on 31th of October 2020.
From this day onwards, product and signature updates will not be available anymore.
Please consider upgrading to THOR 10, which is available for all relevant platforms and architectures.
We are proud to announce the release of THOR Lite. It is a trimmed-down version of THOR v10 with a reduced feature set and the open source signature base used in LOKI and the now obsolete scanner SPARK Core.
It uses the completely rewritten code base of THOR v10 “Fusion” and is therefore faster, more thorough and stable than SPARK.
As you can see in the table below, we’ve come a long way since 2012. We’ve phased out the old THOR version based on Python and SPARK in 2019. Today, we’re replacing the community version of SPARK named SPARK Core with a community version of THOR v10, named THOR Lite.
There are two main differences between THOR Lite and THOR:
- Reduced feature set
- Open source signature base
Apart from that, you’ll get a fully maintained and tested scanner pre-compiled for the Windows, Linux and macOS platform. A limited support is available via the issues section on the github page for auxiliary scripts.
Upgrading from SPARK Core
There is no direct upgrade path from SPARK Core, since SPARK Core and THOR Lite are completely different products and have different upgrade paths.
New users have to subscribe to the newsletter to get download links and a free license. You can subscribe and download THOR Lite using the link on the product page.
SPARK Core users that already have a valid license can use the following download links to download THOR Lite:
Important: These download packages do not include a license. You need to subscribe on the product page to receive a valid license OR use your existing SPARK Core license with THOR Lite.
In this blog post I’d like to outline an idea on how to perform an automated compromise assessment on Citrix Netscaler / Citrix ADC appliances.
I you haven’t heard about that vulnerability yet, you should read my tweets over the past weekend or try to get a full picture with the help of this Reddit.
This blog post is about a subsequent forensic analysis, not detection, not protection and contains no marketing blah-blah.
The described solution should work with the free / open scanners as well. They just don’t have that huge signature set as it is included in THOR.
The reason for this is that although you’ve implemented the workaround on Monday 13th of January, you can’t trust your gateway anymore.
The vulnerability is known since December 17th and the public exploit code available since Friday the 10th of January. Nation state actors have most likely used Christmas holiday season to analyze Netscaler systems in their lab and produce an exploit, just like many offensive researchers did. Since Friday the 10th, even script kiddies can exploit this vulnerbility.
Strictly speaking, you can’t trust these gateways anymore.
But how can we regain trust?
A. Wait for a patched version and reinstall the gateways from the scratch
B. Perform a manual forensic analysis
C. Perform an automated forensic analysis
Automated Analysis with THOR
We don’t have and plan a THOR (SPARK Core or LOKI) version for FreeBSD 8.4, but we could try to mount the remote filesystem of the Netscaler gateway with SSHFS.
DigitalOcean has a good tutorial on how to enable it on your workstation.
sudo sshfs -o allow_other,defer_permissions email@example.com:/netscaler ~/netscaler-mount/
We can then use one of our scanners on that mounted volume using the `–fsonly` parameter (which activates forensic lab mode and scans directories regardless of their type).
With this method, we can detect dropped malicious templates.
Important note: this only works for templates that have been dropped since the last reboot. Users reported that dropped malicious templates get removed during a reboot. As the workaround described by Citrix requires a reboot, scanning with this single YARA rule alone won’t be a reliable method.
I recommend scanning with the full signatures set in all scanners, as they also include rules for web shells and other suspicious content in files. I’ll also extend the YARA rules on github and add further indicators.
We can use the following YARA rule to check for suspicious strings in log files. But we don’t want to use that rule on any Linux/FreeBSD system. Therefore I won’t integrate that YARA rule in the public signature base. You can just copy it from this blog post and place it in the ‘custom-signatures/yara’ sub folder (‘/signatures’ for LOKI).
First, we mount the ‘/var/log’ directory from our remote Netscaler system.
sudo sshfs -o allow_other,defer_permissions firstname.lastname@example.org:/var/log ~/netscaler-logs/
As you can see, the scanner noticed a an issued ‘whoami’ command in the ‘bash.log’ and ‘notice.log’ files, which is a good starting point for further investigations.
Why Integrate THOR into Microsoft Defender ATP
While Microsoft Defender ATP fully plays off its strength in detecting live attacks, suspicious process starts and network connections, THOR shines as a live forensic scanner that scans the local filesystem, registry, logs and other elements for traces of hacking activity.
While Microsoft Defender ATP features a forensic package collection that retrieves elements from a remote system, THOR scans these elements on the remote system, applying more than 10,000 hand-written YARA rules and thousands of filename, C2, hash, mutex and named pipe IOCs to them. This live forensic scan reduces the work of your forensic analysts to a minimum and generates results as fast as possible for you to react in a timely manner.
THOR extends Microsoft Defender ATP’s real-time monitoring by intense local scans to allow a full on-demand compromise assessment.
Due to the fact that both Microsoft Defender ATP and THOR are very flexible and open products, the integration is no one-lane road with a single possible solution. Depending on the network size, segmentation and available 3rd party solutions like a SIEM the integration allows and requires different setups.
This blog post starts with an example use case and then outlines many of these setup options.
Live Response Scripts
The Microsoft Defender Security Center allows us to upload PowerShell scripts into a so called “live response library”, which is available on the endpoint during “live response” sessions.
These scripts allow us to facilitate the download and execution of THOR on the endpoint.
There are two ways to implement different scan modes and parameters. THOR has numerous command line options, which can be passed either as parameters of the PowerShell scripts or predefined in YAML config files.
Example: Turla Malware
We’ll use a simple demo script that contains a path to a file share providing the THOR package.
It uses a config file named “rootkit-check.yml”, which is located in the program folder on the file share. It activates 3 rootkit related modules, sets the path for all output files as rebase-dir and deactivates some features.
We upload that script into a live response session to investigate suspicious behaviour of a workstation that showed several alerts regarding a malware and the use of a “living-off-the-land” binary to run malicious code.
The details reveal that the use of certutil.exe triggered the alert.
We can see other commands like tasklist, net and netstat, which are often used in reconnaissance scripts, executed in the context of a user named “admin”.
We start a “Live Response Session” for further live forensic investigations with the help of THOR.
Since this is our first investigation with that specific script, we have to upload it to the live response library.
We can then verify the upload using the “library” command and run the script from the command line.
It takes about a minute to complete the Rootkit check.
THOR recognized a malicious mutex used by Turla malware and gives further information on the related process and process binary, which can be used for additional verification of the threat.
The HTML report and text log file have been saved back to the file share.
Other Setup Options
In this chapter we describe different methods to provide a THOR package to an end system during live response investigations.
Option A: File Share
The complete THOR package including binaries and signatures can be provided on a network share. This network share should be read-only to avoid that attackers notice the activity and manipulate the program or signatures on the file share.
- Quick setup
- Only a file server is needed
- Requires SMB/CIFS connection from end system to file share
- Scanner / signature updates must be scripted (thor-util.exe)
- Manual license generation (in Nextron’s customer portal) or expensive IR license (not host-based)
Option B: ASGARD Management Center
The central management platform ASGARD Management Center is hardened Debian-based soft appliance that serves as software repository and licensing server in our use case.
The PowerShell scripts in the script library can retrieve THOR packages via HTTPS from the ASGARD Management Center.
- HTTPS download of THOR packages
- Integrated licensing
- Automatic scanner and signature updates
- Additional server system (VM; maintenance)
Option C: THOR via Script Library as SFX
The complete THOR program folder can be packaged into a self-extracting & executing archive (SFX), which could then be uploaded into the “live response library”. It could then be executed right from the script library (run) or uploaded to the end system (put).
- No servers needed
- Microsoft Defender ATP native solution
- Scanner / signature updates and SFX creation must be scripted on an analyst system (thor-util.exe)
- Manual license generation (in Nextron’s customer portal) or expensive IR license (not host-based)
The results of the scans can be stored and transmitted to different locations.
Option A: Log and Report on File Share
THOR writes a log file in real-time during the scan and renders an HTML report at the end of the scan. Users can set an output directory other than the working directory for all output files with the “–rebase-dir” parameter.
This output folder can be a file share, e.g. “\\server\share”.
Analysts can check the log file during the scan, which takes between minutes and hours to complete.
- Only a file server required
- Requires access to file share from the end system (SMB/CIFS)
- File share must be writable (possible manipulation by the attackers)
Option B: SYSLOG, JSON or CEF to SIEM
THOR can send the logs via SYSLOG (UDP, TCP, TCP+SSL, CEF) or in JSON (UDP, TCP, TCP+SSL) to a remote SIEM or log management system.
- Integrates into existing solution and processes
- Requires SIEM system and some base-lining
- Requires connection to port 514 from end system to SIEM system
Option C: SYSLOG, JSON or CEF to ASGARD Analysis Cockpit
ASGARD Analysis Cockpit is the optimized log analysis platform (soft appliance) to process, baseline and forward THOR logs.
It most relevant features in this use case are:
- Base-lining and central false positive filtering
- Event forwarding of filtered events
ASGARD Analysis Cockpit already has several options to create alerts for incoming logs.
- Optimal THOR log base-lining and forwarding of relevant events only
- Additional server system (VM; maintenance)
- Requires connection to port 514 from end system to Analysis Cockpit
Option D: Local Eventlog
THOR can be instructed to log to the local Windows Eventlog with the “—eventlog” command line parameter. Customers that already forward their Windows Application Eventlog to a central SIEM could then use the existing integration and analyze the THOR events in their SIEM.
- Integrates into existing security monitoring
- No additional open port needed
- Requires SIEM system and some base-lining
Option E: Live Response – “getfile”
Local log files that were written to the working directory can be retrieved with the “getfile” command.
- Integrates into analyst workflow
- No additional open port needed
- Files could be left on the end system
(causing false positives in other products; in plain sight for attackers)
This chapter contains an outlook on expected future integrations based on upcoming features and APIs.
The Microsoft Defender ATP API allows to fetch a certain file from a remote system. Similar to the alerting mechanisms via Webhooks in ASGARD Analysis Cockpit, users will be able to fetch any suspicious or malicious file reported by THOR with a given minimum threat score using the Microsoft Defender ATP API.
The upcoming cloud based version of our licensing and download server, which is currently integrated into our customer portal, will be able to serve THOR packages that contain an integrated license for the host which is supposed to be scanned.
This way, you will we be able to run a PowerShell script from the live response library that downloads an up-to-date THOR package with a valid license file right from the new online service and don’t need a local ASGARD server that provides the THOR packages and licenses.
People often tell us that EDR product X already does IOC scanning and that they don’t have to check for these indicators a second time using our scanners. Especially when it comes to network wide sweeps for traces of activity due to an ongoing incident I recommend scanning a second time with one of our scanners or a tool of similar quality.
This blog post explains why.
People usually spend a fair amount of time on selecting threat intel feeds and interesting indicators for their scans. However when it comes to the actual application of these indicators they seem to be satisfied with the simplest form of checks.
Especially when we look at C2 or Filename IOCs I can easily explain the difference between the „compulsory“ and „freestyle“ methods of IOC scanning.
A plain „compulsory“ filename IOC check would walk the disk or query a database looking for a certain filename, right?
However if you think about it for a second and ask yourself „where else could we check for that filename?“ you’ll realize that the following elements could also contain the malicious filename:
- Eventlog entries (e.g. process starts, service installs with image path, access failures …)
- Log files (local Antivirus log file, access to file in web root > web server access log, backup errors, PowerShell history …)
- Registry (recently opened files, shell bags, service image path, other caches …)
- MFT (deleted entries)
- Archive content (packed in ZIP file)
- WMI (scripts – e.g. see this PoC by Matt Graeber)
- Crash dumps
- Windows Error Report (WER – file names and content)
- Free disk space (filename as content of batch files or other scripts, scheduled tasks …)
Actually we often see that during lateral movement attackers access systems, run their tools remotely, copy the output, delete the output files and leave no file system traces behind. Our scanners use the locations mentioned above and others to detect them although all the files have already been removed from disk. That’s the „freestyle“ method.
The same counts for the C2 IOCs. The „compulsory“ plain method would check the system’s network connections.
The „freestyle“ method also includes checking for these C2 IOCs in the following locations:
- Process memory (C2 strings loaded and decrypted in process memory)
- Log files (web server access logs, Windows firewall log file, AV module log file …)
- Hosts file
- Files (in backdoor config files on disk)
- Registry (hard coded C2 server in registry key)
It is sad to see great indicators from expensive feeds used into tools that do „IOC scanning“ the „compulsory“ way missing so many interesting spots.
If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
So – the next time when someone tells you that their tool checks for IOCs on the endpoint, your question should be „How and where do you check for these IOCs?“.
Refactored Handle Detection
We have completely refactored THOR’s malicious Handle detection.
We now allow the use of regular expressions and combined all types in a single signature file named “malicious-handles.dat”.
Users can provide custom indicators by placing a file with the keyword ‘handles’ in name into the folder ./custom-signatures/iocs
Process Handle Match Enrichment
Mutex, Named Pipe or Event matches will now trigger message enrichment in which the alert message is “enriched” with plenty of helpful information on the underlying process, including image file path, parent process and image file hashes.
This helps analysts to evaluate and classify the event.
More Eventlog Sources
We’ve integrated more Windows logs in the default Eventlog scanning to detect keyword and filename IOCs in even more data sources.
This could increase scan duration significantly in cases in which you have defined custom unusually large maximum log sizes.
Custom Eventlog and Registry Exclusions
Users can now exclude certain Registry paths or Eventlogs from scanning.
We’ve added two new and empty exclude files in the ./config sub folder for your convenience.
Support for new Sigma Modifiers
THOR now supports the newest value modifiers used in the most recent version of the Sigma standard.
Case ID (CID) get renamed
Previous versions of THOR offered a parameter -i / –case-id to set a unique identifier that appears as “CID: identifier” in all log lines of this specific scan.
With version 10.3 this CID gets renamed to SCANID and will be generated by default.
Every log line will contain a SCANID that makes it easier to associate a single line with the complete scan in reporting platforms like SIEM systems or ASGARD Analysis Cockpit.
You can still overwrite that value manually for legacy reasons or in order to group multiple scan runs into a single logical report.
- Feature: Log to local syslog with `–local-syslog` (Linux and macOS only)
- Improvement: Filename IOC “slash to backslash” transformation now works platform independent
- Improvement: SHIMCache Analysis in Registry Hives (not just live Registry)
- Improvement: Support for new license type “silent” (allows silent scans used in deployment tests)
- Improvement: YARA rule date in output messages
- Change: -j hostname will also adjust hostname in output file names
- Change: Don’t skip certain Registry paths with `–fullregistry` or in `–intense` mode
- Change: New value “max_file_size_intense” to be able to set a dedicated value for “intense” or “lab” scans
- Bugfix: missing start and end date in HTML report
- Bugfix: Message enrichment module processed duplicate values (e.g. Eventlog contained the filepath C:\w1.exe three times, the message enrichment included the additional attributes like EXISTS, MD5, SHA1, FIRSTBYTES three times, which is unnecessary)
We’ve made a short video demo to showcase the new THOR 10 feature called “THOR Remote”, which allows you to perform compromise assessment scans on multiple remote systems – no agent or scripting required.
New Module “Events”
This module checks registered Events in the system environment as they are used by advanced malware and rootkits.
We have checked for malicious Events before, in the Rootkit module, but these checks were hardcoded. We’ve spun out that section and can now provide regular updates in a separate signature file.
The “Events” module extends our set of rootkit related modules that already include the “Mutex” and “Named Pipe” modules.
THOR DB with Timing Statistics
THOR v10.2 features an unencrypted table in THOR DB that shows timing information for the scanned elements. This could help you identifying elements that lengthen scans significantly and determine a time range in which certain elements have been scanned.
A new switch “–reduced” allows to limit events to “Warning” and “Alert” types only.
- Upgrade to YARA 3.11
- Improved module messages (better description)
- Bugfix: Golden ticket detection module reported far too many Kerberos tickets with too long lifetime, message: “Kerberos ticket with very long life time detected – likely a Golden Ticket”. The issue has been fixed. Please make sure that you haven’t filtered / base-lined that event type.
- Added ExecFlag to SHIMCache output
- Apply YARA rules on WMI Event Filters
- Passing new external YARA variables ‘timezone’ and ‘language’ to registry rule set
- More robust custom YARA signature initialisation (syntax check and tests before compilation)